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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
conclusion. Hopefully, the court, at some future date, will have an op-
portunity to remedy this deficiency.
AiRiL 71- REcovERY oF CHAITEL
CPLR 7102: Due process reconsidered.
Prejudgment seizure of property without notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing came under judicial review in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.181 The United States Supreme Court held therein that
summary wage garnishment, absent these basic procedural safeguards,
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.13 2 Al-
though such protection was at first afforded only "specialized" prop-
erty, 33 such as wages, the Court later, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 34 extended
the prophylactic shield to all types of personalty. 35
New York was forced to respond to the judicial mandates of
Sniadach and Fuentes in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,138
131 395 U.S. 337 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 355,
379 (1971).
182 Wisconsin, whose wage garnishment procedure was invalidated in Sniadach,
responded by passing a far-reaching consumer protection law indicating specifically what
procedures afford due process. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101-427.105 (1974), discussed in
Note, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, The Legislative Response, And
The Economic Implications, 62 GEo. L.J. 273, 305-09 (1973). Notice and opportunity for a
hearing were deemed indispensable prior to the repossession of chattels from consumers.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.205 (1974). This provision is far more specific than the amended
CPLR 7102. L. 1971, ch. 1051, § 1, eff. July 2, 1971. See note 140 and accompanying text
infra.
133The ill-defined concept of "specialized property" has been formulated through
subsequent judicial construction. Commencing with wages in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), it soon extended to include household necessities, Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). The concept was later ex-
panded to include tools and equipment used in one's occupation. Cedar Rapids Engi-
neering Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971),
afJ'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1972).
Until recently, it appeared that prior discussion attempting to define what consti-
tuted "specialized property" had been mooted by Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
The Court therein extended constitutional protection to "any significant property
interest," without classification. Id. at 87. However, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974), wherein Fuentes was limited to require a hearing only before a final
deprivation of property, the Supreme Court retreated from its prior position. In distin-
guishing Sniadach from Mitchell on the basis of wages, the Court seems to have revital-
ized the "specialized property" concept. See text accompanying notes 152-168 infra.
134 407 US. 67 (1972). The Fuentes Court suggested some "extraordinary situations"
might arise in which summary seizures might be allowed, all of them involving govern-
mental or particularly imperative actions. Private replevin actions, however, were not
included. See 22 BUFFALO L. Ry. 17 (1972).
'85 New York courts further extended the protection to include the right to use gas
and electric utilities, prohibiting the seizure of meters and discontinuance of service in
the absence of necessary constitutional safeguards. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Powell, 77
Misc. 2d 475, 354 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1974).
186 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 355, 379 (1971).
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wherein the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York declared the state's replevin statute'37 unconstitutional. The
Laprease court, however, did not go so far as to necessitate notice and an
opportunity for a hearing before seizure could be constitutionally ef-
fectuated. Instead, the court suggested that the "order of a judge or of a
court of competent jurisdiction' ' 8 would satisfy due process require-
ments. 8 9 In responding to Laprease, the New York Legislature enacted
a broadly worded amendment to its replevin statute simply requiring
conformity with due process. 40 As a result, judicial resolution of the
precise procedure necessary to achieve the intended result was inevi-
table.141
Three years after the amendment, defendants in Long Island Trust
Co. v. Porta Aluminum Corp.14 argued that CPLR 7102 remained un-
constitutional. There, a disinterested third-party debtor, Gilbalson, Inc.,
had procured a loan from the plaintiff, offering certain tractors and
trailers as collateral. Gilbalson subsequently sold the chattels in ques-
tion, one tractor and six trailers, to the defendants, representing them
to be free from liens, excluding a tax levy. These items, with the ex-
ception of one trailer, had been specifically enumerated in the security
agreement between the plaintiff and the debtor. Upon the debtor's
default, the plaintiff sought recovery of the security from the defendant-
purchasers. Relief was granted by the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
pursuant to CPLR 7102.143
On defendants' appeal, plaintiff contended that the CPLR as
amended, 44 and viewed in light of Laprease, did not necessitate notice
and an opportunity for a hearing, as specifically required by Fuentes.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in explaining that all of
the provisions of CPLR 7102 must be weighed together and recon-
137 CPLR 7102.
138 315 F. Supp. at 725.
189 Some commentators have failed to distinguish between notice and the opportunity
to be heard, and judicial or court intervention as the requirements for due process. See 35
ALBANY L. REV. 370 (1971); 71 COLJm L. Rv. 889 (1971). The common practice in New
York today is to provide notice before seizure. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice,
171 N.Y.L.J. 4, June 14, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
140 L. 1971, ch. 1051, § 1, eff. July 2, 1971. Under the amended statute a court may
issue an order of seizure "[nupon presentation of [an] affidavit and undertaking and upon
such terms as may be required to conform to the due process of law requirements of the
fourteenth amendment... :' CPLR 7102(d)(1).
141 See 2 N.Y. Srss. Laws [1974] 2641 (McKinney) (Governor's criticism of statutes
ambiguity); 7B McKimNEY's CPLR 7102, supp. commentary at 138 (1971); 7A WK&M
7102.14.
14244 App. Div. 2d 118, 354 N.Y.S.2d 134 (2d Dep't 1974).
143 Id. at 120, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
144 See note 140 supra.
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ciled, 14 apparently adopted the plaintiff's argument and the Laprease
criteria of due process. The court noted:
Clearly, such procedure [used in replevin actions] would not give
a defendant, as was said in Laprease, "an opportunity to be heard
... before his property is seized," but it would compel the plaintiff
to "present to a judicial officer the circumstances allegedly justifying
summary action," which would satisfy "procedural due process"
requirements.146
Nevertheless, the court yielded to Fuentes by recognizing its obligation
"to construe statutes so as to avoid constitutional doubts."'147 Conse-
quently, the constitutionality of CPLR 7102 could only be preserved
by interpreting its due process provision as including whatever the
Supreme Court said such requirements should entail. Thus, the Appel-
late Division, though seemingly displeased with the Fuentes require-
ments, felt constrained to comply with the mandate of the Supreme
Court.
Subsequent to the resolution of the question of constitutionality,
the court summarily disposed of the ancillary issue of whether these
particular defendants had received due process in the absence of open
court testimony. Fuentes had allowed for variations in the form of the
requisite notice and hearing procedures. 14 The court, in the instant
case, was satisfied that the defendants, who "were permitted to submit
lengthy affidavits in opposition to the plaintiff's motion and were heard
in oral argument by the Special Term,"'149 had not been denied due
process. 150 However, factual questions regarding the plaintiff's actions
and the application of the Uniform Commercial Code required the
court to conclude that the granting of the order of seizure had been
improper and could not stand.151
145 44 App. Div. 2d at 122-23, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 139, quoting 1 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 97
(McKinney 1971).
140 Id. at 122, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 138, quoting Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315
F. Supp. 716, 724 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
147 Id. at 123, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 139, quoting People v. LoCicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374, 378,
200 N.E.2d 622, 624, 251 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (1964).
148 The Court in Fuentes stated that "[t]he nature and form of such prior hearings
... are legitimately open to many potential variations ... Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 96 (1972).
149 44 App. Div. 2d at 124, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
150 See Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d
170 (1973), discussed in The Survey 48 ST. JOHN'S L. Ra. 611, 662-64 (1974), wherein
the Court of Appeals, in following Fuentes where summary seizure under the Lien Law
was involved, held that notice and opportunity for a hearing were required, but failed to
specify any particular procedure. Id. at 22, 300 N.E.2d at 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
151 The financing statement covering the loan from Long Island Trust to Gilbalson
included the items covered and the term "(X) Proceeds." The appellants argued that the
inclusion of a reference to proceeds in the statement constituted consent to the sale. Thus,
[Vol. 49:170
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The Second Department's desire to adhere to the more limited
Laprease standard of due process found support in the subsequent
United States Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 152
The Court, in retreating from its Fuentes requirement of notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the deprivation of possession of prop-
erty, 53 permitted summary seizure provided certain protective measures
were maintained. A vigorous dissent, claiming no distinction existed
between Mitchell and Fuentes, mourned the loss of stare decisis.ln 4
Although Justice White, writing for the majority, sought to distinguish
the two decisions,155 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, freely
admitted that the Court had disregarded stare decisis, 56 but felt that it
was justified in so doing.157
In Mitchell, the essential issue centered on whether the Louisiana
procedure of granting ex parte orders of sequestration was violative of
due process. Had the Court followed its precedent in Fuentes, the out-
come would have been predictable. However, the Court chose to impart
a narrower definition of due process. It sought to balance the rights of
the parties, giving the creditor, here the seller of goods, more protection
than had heretofore been granted. Concern was voiced that "the seller's
interest in the property as security"'15s would deteriorate with continued
use by the buyer, and that the seller should, therefore, be protected by
it was urged that plaintiff should have looked to the proceeds, as permitted under the
U.C.C., instead of the items. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (McKinney 1964). Special Term
held that inclusion of the word "Proceeds" did not imply consent to sale. 44 App. Div. 2d
at 120, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 137. The Appellate Division, however, relied upon Hempstead Bank
v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 App. Div. 2d 35, 39-40, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (1970), quoting
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3 (McKinney 1964), which reads:
[A] claim to proceeds in a filed financing statement might be considered as im-
pliedly authorizing sale or other disposition of the collateral, depending upon the
circumstances of the parties, the nature of the collateral, the course of dealing of
the parties and the usage of trade ....
44 App. Div. 2d at 125, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 142. Lacking information to render such a deter-
mination, and considering the possibility of serious economic harm to the appellants, the
court held the order of seizure should not have been issued. Id. at 125-26, 354 N.Y.S.2d
at 142.
152416 U.S. 600 (1974).
153 The Court noted that temporary deprivation of possession before final adjudication
was accepted practice. Id. at 609. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 585 (1971); Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950). The Court in Fuentes, however, had objected
to any deprivation absent notice and the opportunity to be heard. 407 U.S. at 84-86.
154 416 US. 629, 684-85 (Stewart, Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
155 The lack of judicial participation in Fuentes was stressed by Justice White. Id. at
615. See notes 165-168 and accompanying text infra.
IN5 416 U.S. at 623, 627-29 (Powell, J., concurring). This approach avoided the neces-
sity to reconcile Fuentes and Mitchell.
157 Id. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 88, 93 (1986) (Stone &
Cardozo, JJ., concurring). "The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate and even
necessary at times, has only limited application in the field of constitutional law." Id. at 94.
158 416 U.S. at 608.
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sequestration of the property.1 9 The buyer, on the other hand, received
protection against a wrongful seizure through a bond posted by the
seller from which damages could be paid.160 Additionally, the buyer
could have reacquired possession of the property by posting his own
bond as protection for the seller's interests.""' Finally, the Court found
that provision for a complete hearing concerning possession, immedi-
ately following sequestration, protected the debtor against a lengthy
loss. 162 As a result, the opinion expressed satisfaction that the procedure,
in its entirety, protected the parties' respective interests. 163
Two significant considerations entered into the Court's reasoning.
First, support of the creditor was particularly appealing since Louisiana
law caused a vendor's lien to expire immediately upon the buyer's
transfer of possession to a third party.164 Apparently, the Court desired
to provide the creditor with a viable opportunity to offset this threat of
eventual loss of security. Secondly, the Court expressed a desire for
flexibility of procedure.6 5 Yet, the extent to which such flexibility is
available remains uncertain. In Mitchell, the sequestration was author-
ized by a judge; however, as the dissent indicated, outside Orleans
Parish, the court clerk performs the same function. 16 6 Clearly, the lack
of judicial participation in the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin pro-
cedures was a major reason for their being declared unconstitutional in
Fuentes.167 Thus, it is questionable whether the Court would have
maintained flexibility to the extent of upholding a sequestration
authorization issued by someone other than a judge.16
As a result of Mitchell, New York courts will now be able to align
themselves more closely with the due process requirements as set forth
in Laprease. The generality of CPLR 7102 should facilitate conformity
with any necessities newly defined by Mitchell. The statute, under its
present construction, provides for the protection of the debtor in the
15o Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 610.
168 Id.
164 Id.; LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 312, subd. 7 (West 1974).
165 416 U.S. at 610. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945).
166 416 U.S. at 632.
167 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 73-78 (1972).
168 The Court stated, however, that "[c]onsidering the Louisiana procedure as a whole,
we are convinced that the State has reached a constitutional accommodation of the
respective interests of buyer and seller." 416 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court
seemingly defeated one of its own arguments in Fuentes. In parishes other than Orleans,
judicial participation would appear unnecessary for the procedure to satisfy due process
requirements.
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form of an undertaking by the plaintiff, 169 similar to the plaintiff's bond
in Louisiana; the defendant may reclaim possession of the chattel;170 the
statute may be read to require the plaintiff to show that the chattel is in
danger of being destroyed or removed; it may be construed to require
that only a judge may grant an order of seizure; and the requirement of
an immediate post-seizure hearing may be inferred. In short, the vague-
ness of the statute permits interpretation in accordance with Mitchell,
thereby satisfying the flexibility espoused by the Supreme Court therein.
However, it must be noted that New York courts may continue to re-
quire that the debtor receive notice and an opportunity to be heard
prior to sequestration. In light of the Porta decision, this would appear
unlikely.
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW
General Obligations Law § 15-108: Amendment allows plaintiff to
settle with one tortfeasor without affecting his rights against remaining
tortfeasors.
A new subdivision (a) of section 15-108 of the General Obligations
Law' 71 provides that a release given to one of two or more joint tort-
feasors, unless specified to the contrary, releases that tortfeasor only.
Prior to its amendment, section 15-108 stipulated that a release reduced
any eventual recovery of the releasor by the amount indicated in the
release or by the consideration paid for it, whichever was greater.172 As
amended, section 15-108 provides that a release reduces the plaintiff's
recovery by the amount of damages attributable to the released tort-
feasor, if that amount is greater than the amount stipulated in the re-
lease or the consideration paid for it.173 Additionally, subdivision (b)
160 CPLR 7102(e).
17O Prior to revision, CPLR 7103 required that a defendant post a bond before he
could regain possession of a chattel. N.Y. Sss. LAws [1962], ch. 308, § 7103 (McKinney).
The plaintiffs in Laprease contended that such a requirement was violative of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment since it was discriminatory against the
poor. While the court found it unnecessary to consider that contention, the legislature
eliminated the possibility of a recurrence of that argument with the removal of the bond
requirement. 7B McKiNmEY's CPLR 7103, supp. commentary at 139 (1971). Mitchell, how-
ever, approved the requirement for such a bond for the protection of the creditor. As a
result, an issue arises as to whether the New York provision may be viewed as a violation
of the creditor's rights.
171 N.Y. SEss. LAws [1974], ch. 742, § 3 (McKinney).
172 N.Y. GEN. OBLuc. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1970).
173This amendment is intended to encourage settlements and simultaneously assure
that no non-settling tortfeasor will be liable for more of the damages than his equitable
share. See TwELPTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JuDiCAL CONFERENCE TO THE LEGIsLATURE ON
T= CPLR, as appearing in 2 N.Y. Sss. LAws [1974] 1817 (McKinney). Another purpose
of this subsection is to allow injured parties to settle their claims against one defendant
1974]
